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with reducing their greenhouse gas emissions in order to prevent the rise with 2 degrees Celsius in 
global temperature. This paper is an analysis of the above-mentioned event, which focuses on its 
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  1.  THE  EUROPEAN  UNION  (EU)
5:  A  GLOBAL  PLAYER  IN   PROMOTING 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
6 
   
‖While  it  faces  considerable  problems  in  making  an  effective  response  to  its  own 
environmental deterioration, the EU has  nevertheless developed  an  important leadership role  in 
global environmental politics and is an active participant in numerous international environmental 
regulatory regimes‖ (Baker, 2000, p. 304). This is partly due to the fact that the EU environmental 
policy has gained treaty recognition in 1986 with the adaptation of Single European Act (SEA). 
Also, the capacity of EU to act internationally  in global environmental politics is given by the 
                                                             
5  European  Community  (EC)  is  the  legally  correct  term  in  reference  to  the  EU‘s  participation  in  international 
environmental treaties. We prefer to use the term European Union (EU) throughout this article. 
6 Sustainable development is a pattern of resource use that aims to meet human needs while preserving the environment 
so that these needs can be met not only in the present, but also for future generations. The term was used by the 
Brundtland Commission which coined what has become the most often-quoted definition of sustainable development as 
development that "meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their 
own needs." Retrieved Monday, May 3
rd 2010 from: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sustainable_development . See also: 
http://www.un-documents.net/ocf-02.htm   
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Maastricht Treaty
7. Article 130r has been amended to include ―promoting measures at international 
level  to  deal  with  regional  or  world-wide  environmental  problems‖(art.  130r  (1)  TEU).  David 
Pearce
8 states that ―this extension of the sphere of influence reflected growing evidence that some 
environmental problems could be tackled only at global level‖ (Pearce, 2001, p. 216). 
With regard to sustainable development, it has long been one of the overarching objectives 
of EU policy. Without defining the term, the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 introduced the notion of 
the achievement of sustainable development as one of tasks of the EU set out in Article 2. This 
meant that the EU engaged itself with the idea of sustainable development. Furthermore, EU leaders 
launched the first EU sustainable development strategy (EU SDS) in 2001 and updated it in 2006 to 
tackle  shortcomings  and  take  account  of  new  challenges.  A  set  of  sustainable  development 
indicators (SDIs) have been developed in order to establish whether the EU efficiently addresses 
these challenges or not. The list of SDIs is available on the official page of Eurostat, which is also 
responsible with publishing a progress report on the EU SDS every two years. The World Summit 
on  Sustainable  Development  in  Johannesburg  in  2002  marked  ―another  milestone  in  the 
development of the EU role within the environmental sphere‖ (Lightfoot and Burchell, 2004, p. 
337). The Review of the EU Sustainable Development Strategy (in 2009) underlines that in recent 
years  the  EU  has  mainstreamed  sustainable  development  into  a  broad  range  of  its  policies 
(European  Commission,  2009).  It  also  stresses  that  one  of  the  key  challenges  for  sustainable 
development, defined as ―economic and social development that is sustained through time‖ (Pearce, 
2001, p. 231), in the EU is climate change. 
  As far as climate change is concerned, the 1992 Rio de Janeiro Earth Summit
9 resulted in 
two major international environmental agreements
10 to which the EU is signatory. One of them was 
the United Nations Framework Convention
11 on Climate Change (UN FCCC) which addressed 
solving the issue of increased Earth surface temperature due to emission of greenhouse gases. This 
document has been a controversial one , especially in the EU and the United States (US). ―The 
source of controversy  has  not been  science  but the  implications  for environmental policy:  it  is 
difficult to see how greenhouse gas emission reduction can be secured without raising the price of 
energy significantly‖ (Pearce, 2001, p. 231). However, the EU, with a special status at UNCED, is 
                                                             
7 Formally known as Treaty on the European Union (TEU) 
8 Professor David W. Pearce OBE was an Emeritus Professor at the Department of Economics in the University College 
London (UCL). He specialised in, and was a pioneer of, Environmental Economics, having published over fifty books 
and over 300 academic articles on the subject including his 'Blueprint for a Green Economy' series. Retrieved Monday, 
May 3
rd 2010 from: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Pearce_%28economist%29  
9 The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) 
10 The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UN FCCC) and the United Nations Convention on 
Biological Diversity 
11 A convention is a multilateral treaty which is passed by the General Assembly, the legislature of the United Nations  
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party to the UN FCCC. Also, the EU is an active participant in the Kyoto Protocol on Climate 
Change,  which  was  the  document  that  followed  the  UN  FCCC.  In  the  context  of  the  Kyoto 
Protocol, the EU has committed itself to jointly reducing its greenhouse gas emissions by 8% (the 
largest  cut,  greater  than  the  7%  national  reduction  target  of  the  US,  which  did  not  ratify  the 
Protocol) from 1990 levels by 2008-2012. That was possible because the EU had worked out a 
common negotiation position with its Member States. Moreover, the EU is signatory to the UN 
Montreal Protocol on Ozone Depletion.  
  All  the  above-mentioned  documents  are  international  multilateral  agreements  between 
sovereign states. The EU is not a state. Nevertheless, being signatory to such agreements proves that 
the EU ―has stepped up efforts to gain formal recognition as an international actor in environmental 
policy‖ (Lenschow, 2005, p. 323) and that it has taken the lead in the fight against climate change 
and the promotion of a low-carbon economy. Given this, the EU should be considered a global 
player in promoting sustainable development.  
  This might explain why, behaving like a ―leading protagonist for a stringent international 
regime, frequently holding out in negotiations against the US for higher targets for emission cuts‖ 
(Baker, 2000, p. 328), the EU is currently working for a global agreement. Such a global agreement 
would  help  reduce  global  emissions  of  greenhouse  gas  beyond  2012,  which  is  when  the  first 
commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol ends. Moreover, this sort of agreement will facilitate the 
introduction of a new financial architecture. For that matter, it should be legally binding. 
 
  2. THE 2009 UN CLIMATE CHANGE CONFERENCE AND THE COPENHAGEN 
ACCORD 
 
  According to the Bali Road Map, a framework for climate change mitigation beyond 2012 
was to be agreed at the 2009 UN Climate Change Conference  in Copenhagen. The conference 
included the 15th Conference of the Parties (COP 15) to the UN FCCC and the 5th Meeting of the 
Parties (COP/MOP 5) to the Kyoto Protocol. It was described on the official website of the UN 
FCCC as ―an exceptional event that attracted unprecedented participation and resulted in attendance 
by 120 Heads of State and Government and raising climate discussions to a new level‖
12.  
  It  is  important to  notice  that  these  Heads  of  State  and  Government  (of  developing  and 
developed countries) came with different expectations at the Copenhagen Summit. ―For the EU the 
Copenhagen Summit was originally about the final sharing-out of the remaining carbon budget of 
                                                             
12 See: http://unfccc.int/meetings/cop_15/items/5257.php   
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cumulative greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions of around 1,550 billion tonnes of CO2eq that are left 
until 2050. For many other countries, including industrialized ones, the Copenhagen Summit has 
been more about architecture than about cuts in carbon emissions as such‖(Egenhofer and Georgiev, 
2009).  
  When it comes to perspectives, those of developing countries differ from those of developed 
countries. ―Developed countries are more concerned about global problems such as climate change, 
while developing countries attach greater priority to rural issues such as desertification and soil 
erosion and urban environmental issues such as water pollution and air quality in cities‖(Newell, 
2005,  pp.  222-223).  Also,  ―many  developing  countries  have  been  critical  of  the  way  in  which 
certain issues (debt, terms of trade, regulation of multinational companies) have been actively kept 
off the  agenda of summits‖ (Newell, 2005, pp. 224-225). For the developing  countries climate 
change mitigation is ―a short-term ‗constraint on economic growth‘, mainly but not only because it 
puts  a  constraint  on  the  use  of  coal‖  (Egenhofer  and  Georgiev,  2009).  For  the  industrialized 
countries (including the EU) ―climate change mitigation is framed in the context of green growth 
and  jobs  and  future  competitiveness‖  (Egenhofer  and  Georgiev,  2009).  Moreover,  developing 
countries  view  developed  countries  as  main,  sometimes  sole,  producers  of  greenhouse  gas  and 
expect the  latter to  make  cuts  in  GHG  emissions  first. In  the  context of  adaptation  to  climate 
change, ―developing countries, especially least-developed countries, are more vulnerable as their 
adaptive capacity tends to be lower than that of richer countries‖ (Egenhofer and Georgiev, 2009).  
Apart from technologies for adaptation to climate change, ―for developing countries, one of the key 
concerns has been the growth in environmental standards that many fear will be used as barriers to 
trade and discussed forms of protectionism to protect Northern producers from competitive exports 
from the South‖ (Newell, 2005, p.225). These expectations and perspectives might help explain 
what happened at the Copenhagen Summit. 
  Shortly  after  the  summit  began,  a  draft  document,  the  so-called  ―Danish  text‖,  leaked. 
According  to  John  Vidal,  in  the  Guardian,  this  draft  agreement  would  have  forced  developing 
countries to agree to specific emission cuts and measures that were not part of the original UN 
agreement, further divide the category of developing countries by introducing the category of so-
called ―most vulnerable‖ countries, weaken the UN role in handling climate finance by handing 
effective control of climate change finance to the World Bank and not allow poor countries to emit 
more than 1.44 tonnes of carbon per person by 2050, while allowing rich countries to emit 2.67 
tonnes  (Vidal,  2009).  The  ―Danish  text‖  caused  developing  countries  to  react  furiously.  Their 
protests lead to prolonged negotiations.   
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  Ten days later, on December 18
th an agreement was ―reached‖ between the United States 
and  the  BASIC  countries:  China  (as  the  world's  biggest  producer of  carbon  dioxide,  the  chief 
greenhouse gas), India, South Africa and Brazil. This was done without democratically involving 
other important parties to the UN FCCC (the EU) in the drafting process and in the final round of 
negotiations. The result was a legally non-binding document, namely the Copenhagen Accord.   
  This document meant that developed countries, including the US, recognized the scientific 
case for keeping the rise in global temperature to 2°C. Also, developed countries committed to 
jointly  mobilizing  $100  billion  annually  by  2020  from  both  public  and  private  sources  and  to 
providing financial resources that would help developing countries (especially the least-developed 
ones) to mitigate and adapt their technology to climate change. Moreover, the importance of carbon 
markets, which are important for the EU environmental policy, has also been recognized.  
  Reactions to this document were diverse. ―Judging from the high rhetoric heard before the 
Copenhagen meeting, urging parties to complete negotiations on a new international agreement on 
climate change to follow the Kyoto Protocol, the results (the Copenhagen Accord) must be seen as a 
failure‖(Egenhofer  and  Georgiev,  2009,  p.3)  or  a  ―disaster‖,  according  to  the  EU  Swedish 
Environment  Minister  Andreas  Carlgren.  Moderates  described  the  outcome  as  ―neither  earth-
shattering nor a failure‖ (Levi and Rubenstein, 2009) or as a foundation for global action, although 
―there is much further to go‖ (US President-elect Barack Obama).  
  For us, the Copenhagen Accord is a curious case and proof that the EU is no longer the 
leader of the fight against climate change. The EU has played a marginal role at the Copenhagen 
Summit and so did the US. The Copenhagen Accord, which is yet to be adopted by UN FCCC 
parties, is also a perfect example of a deadlock. China (a developing country) refused to agree with 
the US nonnegotiable proviso: ―all other major nations would first be required to commit their 
emissions reduction to a binding agreement and submit these reductions to ‗transparent verification‘ 
in greenhouse gas emissions data (Lee, 2009). The Chinese officials argued that such a degree of 
transparency would be a violation of Chinese sovereignty and national interests, when in fact ―Wen 
(Jiabao) would not want foreign experts reporting to political masters in America and Europe that 
Beijing's capacity to compel local officials and locally managed, state-controlled enterprises-some 
120,000 companies and countless other subsidiaries - to implement climate-change initiatives is 
extremely poor‖ (Lee, 2009). Therefore, negotiations at the Copenhagen Summit focused on the US 
and China trying to reach a legally binding agreement for fighting climate change. In order to seal a 
deal that would have also helped passing new climate change legislation in the US, Barack Obama 
accepted China‘s conditions. That may be why the Copenhagen Accord has also been described as 
―probably the weakest compromise in the world‖ (Deutsche Bank, 2009).  
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  Also, the Copenhagen Accord marked a shift in global order. As stated before, the EU and 
the  US  played  marginal  roles  during  the  Copenhagen  Summit.  This  time  developing  countries 
(Non-Annex  I  Parties
13)  were  the  ones  to  make  their  voices  heard  in  UN  climate  change 
negotiations. The only problem was that they did not speak with one voice: while the G4 group of 
developing countries sided with the US in drafting the Copenhagen Accord, the G77 group of least-
developed countries protested vehemently against the former. As a result, on the 19
th of December, 
COP only ―took note‖ of the Copenhagen Accord. 
 
  3. THE US RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE 
 
  In  order  to  better  understand  why  a  legally  binding  agreement  was  not  reached  in 
Copenhagen, we also need to explain the way in which sustainable development is perceived and 
how the climate change issue is dealt with within the US. 
  With regard to sustainable development, ―like any other policy commitment, it ultimately 
requires  the  support  of  (the  US)  Congress  and  strong,  effective  legislation.  However,  for  the 
Republican leaders in Congress, sustainable development is simply a problem for other countries to 
worry about, particularly developing countries‖ (Bryner, 2000, p. 277).  
  As far as climate change is concerned, ―the US Congress joined the debate in July 1997 
when the Senate unanimously passed a resolution (Senate Resolution 98
14) aimed at ensuring that 
the US and other developed countries would n ot sign a climate change agreement that did not 
impose on developing countries at least some (if not similar) commitments to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions‖ (Bryner, 2000, pp.291-292). This ―reply‖ to the Berlin Mandate
15 specified that any 
climate change treaty should include commitments for greenhouse gas reduction for developing 
countries and should not result in serious harm to the US economy. ―Without binding commitments 
from the developing countries industry representatives (in the US) charge that this will unfairly 
advantage developing countries industries in global markets‖ (Bryner, 2000, p. 293). Also, during 
the 90s, environmental ―agreements have either advantaged or imposed fewer burdens on European 
producers compared to their American competitors. Hence the US  has generally opposed these 
                                                             
13 See: http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/items/2704.php  
14 Available on-line at: http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d105:SE00098:  
15 The Berlin Mandate exempted non-Annex I countries (developing countries) from additional binding obligations, in 
keeping with the principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities" established in the UNFCCC even though, 
collectively, the larger, newly industrializing countries were expected to be th e world's largest emitters of greenhouse 
gas  emissions  15  years  hence.  Retrieved  Wednesday,  May  5
th  2010  from: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Framework_Convention_on_Climate_Change#1995_-
_COP_1.2C_The_Berlin_Mandate   
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agreements, while EU has supported them‖ (Vogel and Kelemen, 2007). That may also explain why 
the EU, not the US, became a leader of the fight against climate change during the 90s.  
  At present, passing new climate change legislation
16 that would show commitment of the US 
to the idea of fighting climate change is a difficult process, given the lack of involvement from the 
US Congress. Although the House of Representatives passed the climate change bill, climate 
change legislation must also get through the Senate (Reuters, 2009). Otherwise, the result might 
very well be another deadlock at the COP 16/COP 6 Conference in Mexico later this year. 
 
4.  THE  COPENHAGEN  ACCORD,  A  GLOBAL  GREEN  ECONOMY  AND 
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 
 
  The Copenhagen Summit may have also been a first attempt to introduce a new economic 
model, a global green economy
17. As proof, in February 2010 Fox News revealed to the public a 
leaked UNEP
18 discussion paper
19 on the green economy which states that ―shifting towards a green 
economy will also help to address challenges posed by climate change‖
20. On the UNEP official 
website of GEI
21 we find that: ―UNEP has also been working with a large number of UN agencies 
and other intergovernmental partners to harmonise green economy policy messages.  For example, 
in June 2009, UNEP, together with more than 20 UN agencies, the IMF
22 and the World Bank, 
issued a  joint statement
23, which noted that the current financial and economic crisis requires a 
collective response from the global community that lays a solid foundation for shared growth and 
sustainable  development‖
24.  This  statement  concluded:  ―The  solidarity  of  the  international 
community is being tested. The most representative test case is when governments meet to seal the 
deal on climate change in Copenhagen in December 2009. Let Copenhagen be the turning point for 
ushering in a global green economy‖
25. Could the possibility of UNEP introducing a new economic 
                                                             
16 The Obama-Biden comprehensive New Energy for America plan 
17 See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Green_economy  
18 United Nations Environmental Programme 
19 Available on-line at: http://www.foxnews.com/projects/pdf/022510_greeneconomy.pdf  
20 See: http://www.foxnews.com/projects/pdf/022510_greeneconomy.pdf 
21 Green Economy Initiative 
22 International Monetary Fund 
23Available  on -line  at: 
http://www.unep.ch/etb/pdf/2009%20statement%20deliver%20as%20one/Interagency%20Joint%20Statement.%20E%2
0rev1.pdf  
24 See: http://www.unep.org/greeneconomy/Partnerships/tabid/1380/language/en-US/Default.aspx  
25Retrieved  Wednesday,  May  5
th  2010  from: 
http://www.unep.ch/etb/pdf/2009%20statement%20deliver%20as%20one/Interagency%20Joint%20Statement.%20E%2
0rev1.pdf   
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model based on limited natural resource use explain why the Copenhagen Summit resulted only in 
―taking note‖ of a politically binding agreement? 
  What is even more curious is that a UN FCCC negotiating text
26, a document which was 
published  before  the  Copenhagen  Summit,  stated  that:  ―The  scheme  for  the  new  institutional 
arrangement under the Convention will be based on three basic pillars: government; facilitative 
mechanism;  and  financial  mechanism,  and  the  basic  organization  of  which  will  include  the 
following: (a) The government will be ruled by the COP with the support of a new subsidiary body 
on adaptation, and of an Executive Board responsible for the management of the new funds and the 
related facilitative processes and bodies. The current Convention secretariat will operate as such, as 
appropriate‖
27. Was it the fear of countries signatories to the UN FCCC for losing their sovereignty 
to an international COP-led government that prevented ―sealing of the deal‖? 
  There is also another explanation. Although developed countries have committed themselves 
to providing financial resources to developing countries by means of a Copenhagen Green Climate 
Fund, where such funding will come from is not specified in the Copenhagen Accord. The draft text 
only mentions that ―this funding will come from a wide variety of sources, public and private, 
bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources of finance‖
28. This vague statement might 
give the opportunity to international financial institutions to undermine the UN FCCC. Both the 
IMF and the World Bank have outlined and implemented climate change financing ideas. The IMF 
proposed a ―Green Fund‖
29, while the World Bank portfolio of climate investment funds consists of 
the CTF
30 and the SCF
31. For the World Bank, financing will take the form of credit enhancement 
and risk management tools, such as loans, grants, equity stakes, guarantees and other support 
mobilised  through  donor  contributions  t o  the  respective  trust  funds  and  implemented  in 
collaboration with the regional development banks (Tan, 2008). 
  At this point, we ask ourselves: ―what would happen if developing countries do not return 
the loans awarded by the World Bank?‖ The term neocolonialism
32 comes to mind. ―Africa today 
pays more money every year in debt service payments to the IMF and World Bank than it receives 
in  loans  from  them,  thereby  often  depriving  the  inhabitants  of  those  countries  from  actual 
                                                             
26 Available on-line at: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/awglca7/eng/inf02a02.pdf  
27 Retrieved Wednesday, May 5
th 2010 from: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/awglca7/eng/inf02.pdf  
28 See: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/l07.pdf  
29 See: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2010/POL032510A.htm  
30 Clean Technology Fund 
31  Strategic Climate Fund 
32 Neocolonialism is a term used by post-colonial critics of developed countries' involvement in the developing world. 
Writings  within  the  theoretical  framework  of  neocolonialism  argue  that  existing  or  past  international  economic 
arrangements created by former colonial powers were or are used to maintain control of their former colonies and 
dependencies after the colonial independence movements of the post-World War II period. Retrieved Wednesday, May 
5
th 2010 from: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neocolonialism   
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necessities. This dependency allows the IMF and World Bank to impose Structural Adjustment 
Plans upon these nations. Adjustments that largely consist of privatization programs which result in 
deteriorating health, education, an inability to develop infrastructure, and in general, lower living 
standards‖
33. That may offer an explanation for the G77‘s protests. 
  Let us not forget about the ―curse‖ of the developing countries: natural resources, which are 
described as ―gifts of nature‖ on the official page of the World Bank Group. It is important to notice 
that  international  financial  institutions  may  adopt  ―a  competing  perspective  that  has  long  been 
present in the study and practice of world politics which views natural resources as an instrument of 
control  and  leverage  over  other  states‖  (Hastedt  and  Knickrehm,  2003,  p.  284).  By  ―natural 
resources‖ we mean oil (the most important natural resource of the 70s, 80s and 90s), natural gas 
and fresh water (the most important natural resources in the last decade), even forests and clean air 
(probably the  most  important natural resources  in decades to come). Bearing this  in  mind, the 
reaction of the G77 group was justified. 
  Last, but not least, ―international financial institutions have directly promoted and financed 
fossil fuel-intensive projects throughout the developing world; the immediate beneficiaries of the 
World Bank‘s projects are G7-based corporations‖(Sobhani and Retallack, 2001, p.224). Also, ―by 
building  fossil  fuel-based  infrastructures  so  mindlessly  throughout  the  world  to  meet  the  ever 
growing energy-intensive needs of economic globalization and the development model it promotes, 
the  World  Bank  and  the  other  multilateral  development  agencies  are  playing  a  leading  role  in 
fuelling climate change‖ (Sobhani and Retallack, 2001, p.224).  
  All the above explanations may shed some light on the curious case of the Copenhagen 
Accord. 
 
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
  The expectations for the 2009 UN FCCC Conference were not reached. The Copenhagen 
Summit has been an attempt of introducing a legal framework for a new economic model, the green 
economy, and a new institutional arrangement. Negotiations for a legally binding agreement for 
climate change mitigation have been deadlocked. Not being involved in the drafting process of the 
Copenhagen Accord and thus not being able make its voice heard, the EU has currently lost its 
leader  status  in  the  fight  against  climate  change.  The  result  of  the  Copenhagen  Summit,  the 
                                                             
33 See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neocolonialism#Neocolonialism_allegations_against_the_IMF   
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Copenhagen Accord, remains a curious case because there seems to be more than one explanation 
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